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Reforming German Labor Market Institutions: 
A Dual Path to Flexibility 
 
Germany has always been one of the prime examples of institutional complementarities 
between social insurance, a rather passive welfare state, strong employment protection and 
collective bargaining that stabilize diversified quality production. This institutional 
arrangement was criticized for being the main cause of inferior labor market performance and 
increasing fiscal pressure on the welfare state while at the same time inhibiting institutional 
change. However, over the last 15 years, a sequence of institutional reforms has 
fundamentally modified the functioning of the German labor market and increased both 
flexibility and job creation capacities through two intimately linked processes that redefined 
the line between inactivity, the flexible and the standard segment of the labor market. On the 
one hand, policy changes facilitated the expansion of flexible or ‘atypical’ jobs, whereas 
increasing flexibility of the standard employment relationship resulted from wage moderation 
and working time flexibility. While at the outset of this reform sequence German had a small, 
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Throughout the 1990s, Germany was seen in line with other Continental Euro-
pean countries as the “sick man in Europe”. Sluggish economic growth, a wors-
ening labor market performance, apparently unsustainable social security sys-
tems, and the incapability to implement substantial reforms caused some pessi-
mism about the future prospects of the German economic system. However, the 
reform activities of the past years and especially the remarkable recent employ-
ment growth made it necessary to revise the image of the Continental laggard. 
Germany’s comeback (as well as substantial change in other Bismarckian welfare 
states) gave comparative labor market research something to puzzle about. After 
the 1990s debate was mainly about explaining inferior performance and inertia, 
the unexpected liberalizing tendencies of the 2000s shifted the focus towards ex-
plaining institutional change. The questions that occurred were how change does 
proceed in a context of path-dependent institutions and what does determine dif-
ferent  trajectories  of  change.  The following  article  shares  the  interest  in  these 
questions. 
It is often argued that Germany followed a strategy of flexibility at the margin to 
modernize its labor market. In this logic of reform, the traditional institutional 
setting of standard employment is preserved, but supplemented with a secon-
dary segment of ‘atypical’ jobs. This development can be understood as a new 
distribution of labor market risks: due to reform obstacles in the core of the labor 
market, flexibilization at the margin was seen as the only viable option. While 
thereby the privileges of standard employment contracts could be maintained, 
the price to be paid has been a growing dualization in terms of wages and em-
ployment security. 
The main research questions of this paper are a) how the reform path leading to a 
bifurcated labor market can be explained and b) whether bifurcation constitutes 
a new, stable equilibrium. Concerning the latter, there is reason to doubt the pes-
simistic notion that change in the German labor market constitutes a one-way 
street to dualization. Marginal flexibilization might aim at stabilizing the overall 
system in the  first place by decreasing  reform pressure, but inevitably it also 
produces some repercussions for the core of the system. The paper shows that, as 
a reaction to the growth of non-standard jobs, employment for insiders became 
significantly more flexible. In contradiction to orthodox policy advice, this flexi-
bilization  did  not  take  place  by  increasing  external  flexibility  through  easing 
dismissal protection. Rather, it was achieved by a liberalization of collective bar-
gaining,  allowing  for  a great  deal  of  flexibility  on  the  plant  level  in  terms  of 3 
 
working  time  and  remuneration.  In  principle,  flexibilization  of  standard  em-
ployment should be regarded contradictory to dualization, as it increases the in-
clusiveness of the primary segment by lowering hiring barriers. 
Analyzing interdependencies  between the  margin and the  core  has important 
implications  for  understanding  institutional  change  in  Continental  European 
welfare states. If the reaction of insiders is taken into account, dualization can not 
be considered the final outcome of change, but only one stage in a longer process 
of renegotiating the distribution of risks and privileges  between  labor market 
segments. Following Palier and Martin’s (2007) sequentialist view, it is the aim of 
this article to reveal a typical Continental pattern in the reform of the German 
employment  system.  The  determinants  of  such  a  sequential  development  are 
various inherent barriers to change and a distinct short-term orientation, favor-
ing incoherent or even contradictory reform stages. Moreover, we believe that 
the  resulting trajectory  leads  beyond  partial  flexibilization -  to  a  fundamental 
overhaul of the system and more inclusive standard employment. 
The paper is organized as follows: at first, the traditional setting of the German 
labor market and its political economy are analyzed as a point of departure for 
labor market reform. The subsequent sections trace the reform sequences across 
the past 30 years and analyze their impact on the current institutional setting. In 
order to understand the process of dualization, each section looks at the chang-
ing flexibility of both, the core and the margin of the labor market and asks how 
it altered the conditions for following reforms.   
 
2. The German Employment Model and the Standard Employment Relation-
ship (‘Normalarbeitsverhältnis’) 
 
German  labor  market  institutions  matured  in  the  ‘golden’  post-war  era.  Al-
though the process of establishing a modern labor market regulation and the ex-
pansion of wage labor date back to the 19th century, the pre-world war II em-
ployment contract was far from providing as much security as it does nowadays. 
It was only in the exceptional post-war situation with its enormous growth rates 
and labor shortages that the privileges of the so called ‘Normalarbeitsverhältnis’ 
(standard  employment  relationship)  could  be  achieved  (Mückenberger  1985, 
Pierenkemper 2009). The term describes a dependent, permanent full-time job 
with dismissal protection, full integration into status-protecting social insurance 
and collectively  set wages  significantly  above  the  subsistence  level.  However, 
this employment system with a highly privileged group at its core required low 4 
 
labor utilization - a feature which became a heavy burden later on. With reason-
able simplification one could say that classical German labor market institutions 
were associated with few, but only good jobs. The other side of the coin was the 
minor role of the service sector, in particular labor intensive personal services 
which were predominantly delivered as unpaid work in the family context and 
not via markets. The fact that inequality is not so much caused by wage disper-
sion, but rather by uneven access to the primary labor market, is an important 
difference from more flexible systems. Largely excluding women from participa-
tion and thereby reducing wage competition allowed male breadwinners to earn 
a  sufficient  family  wage  (Esping-Andersen  1999).  For  a  long  time  during  the 
1980s and early 1990s, the strategy of reducing labor supply was also applied to 
older workers via generous early-retirement schemes. By and large, the exclusion 
of less productive workers made higher wages for insiders possible, but heavily 
burdened social insurance by financing inactivity (Hemerijck 2002). The devel-
opments, which put this system under pressure, are well known: women started 
to push for labor market participation (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002) and due to 
demographic projections, policy makers increasingly considered more inclusive 
labor markets desirable. For the same reason, but especially for the costs it im-
posed on social insurance, the strategy of ‘labor shedding’ proved to be hardly 
sustainable (Ebbinghaus 2006). This was even more so when applied to the for-
mer GDR after reunification (Manow/Seils 2000). Finally, international competi-
tion in terms of labor costs provided attractive exit options from the expensive 
German system or at least improved the bargaining position for employers. 
To understand why the reaction to these tendencies did not include a bold flexi-
bilization of the ‘rigid’ standard employment contract, but rather aimed at creat-
ing a secondary tier with atypical jobs, one has to take into account complemen-
tarities between labor market regulation and the German manufacturing system. 
Streeck (1991) describes this model as “diversified quality production”. In con-
trast to the price-competitive, Taylorist approach in Anglo-Saxon countries, its 
comparative advantage derives from high quality standards, a diversified prod-
uct range and customization. For its superior performance, the model requires 
skilled labor, which in turn facilitates high productivity and high wages. As in-
novations typically are incremental and based upon employees’ experiences with 
products and customer expectations, firm or industry-specific knowledge is of 
major importance in diversified quality production. Overcoming disincentives to 
invest in such specific skills (which must be considered sunk costs in case of a job 
loss), requires complementary labor market institutions. The corresponding type 
of employment is close to the ‘Normalarbeitsverhältnis’. It comprises dual ap-
prenticeships (to generate occupation-specific skills), dismissal protection (to fa-5 
 
vor longer job duration), status-maintaining unemployment insurance (to protect 
skills from being depreciated in another occupation), and collective bargaining 
(to prevent fluctuation of wages) (Estevez-Abe/Iversen/Soskice 2001). In theory, 
this “high skill equilibrium” (Finegold/Soskice 1988) must be considered an ob-
stacle to fundamental labor market reform, as a change in standard employment 
could undermine the foundation of the entire production model. 
Additional explanations for the inertia of the core labor market derive from the 
political economy of Continental welfare states. Labor market and welfare re-
forms, which always entail short-term costs for parts of the electorate, typically 
are unpopular and therefore not very attractive for office-seeking policy makers 
(Esping-Andersen 1996, Pierson 1996, Boeri et al. 2001). This is especially true for 
the ideal-type Continental welfare state where contributory systems create a high 
legitimacy of unemployment benefits: social transfers are perceived as acquired 
rights rather than benevolence and so they receive high popular support. Addi-
tionally,  union  involvement  in  the  administration  of  benefit  schemes  provide 
some veto power to advocates of the status quo (Palier/Martin 2007). A similar 
problem occurs with strict employment protection. Once in place, such rules cre-
ate its own constituency, because they maintain workers in jobs that would have 
been destructed otherwise. By increasing job tenure, employment protection sets 
incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This in turn provides higher 
rents to job holders (due to the productivity differential compared to outsiders). 
As a consequence, workers who already invested in specific skills and benefit 
from seniority wages form an opposition towards the liberalization of dismissal 
laws (Saint-Paul 2002). 
Hence, institutional features of Continental welfare states create a political econ-
omy much in favor of resilience. Against the backdrop of severe reform obstacles 
in the core of the system, piecemeal reform at the margins appears as the only 
viable reform strategy. By contrast, comprehensive reforms are more likely in 
cases where policy makers either do not face powerful veto players (Bonoli 2001, 
Huber/Stephens 2001) or where they can rely on an infrastructure for tripartite 
talks and a sufficient level of trust among the actors to negotiate social  pacts 
(Ebbinghaus/Hassel 2000, Hassel 2003). Accordingly, the German political sys-
tem with its federalism and weak tripartite coordination impedes encompassing 
reform strategies (Eichhorst/Konle-Seidl 2006). 
These institutional features can explain the distinct reform path of Germany and 
other  Continental  welfare  states.  Due  to  the  inherent  hurdles  for  reform,  the 
transformation  proceeded  in  a  rather  fragmented  way,  imposing  a  gradual 
change that did not lead to direct confrontation with advocates of the status quo. 6 
 
To capture this phenomenon there has been some theorizing about incremental, 
but yet effective transformation in institutional contexts with low malleability. 
Models  like  “layering”  (Thelen  2002),  “drift”  (Hacker  2003)  or  “conversion” 
(Thelen  2004)  introduced  the  basic  notion  of  institutional  change  without  (or 
with only very modest) formal revision. It states that in some cases the process of 
change is composed of fractional reform steps, which (taken for themselves) only 
have a minor impact while their accumulated results can significantly alter the 
status-quo. Layering, for example, describes a process of change where a rigid 
institutional arrangement is supplemented by an alternative and more flexible 
institution at its margin. At the time of introduction, the role of this secondary 
institution can be insignificant, but given a process of differential growth it may 
crowd out the established one and therefore change the entire logic without for-
mal revision of the initial institution (Streeck/Thelen 2005). In a similar fashion, 
drift occurs where the context of an institutional arrangement changes so that it 
does not serve its original purpose anymore. Exogenous influences like economic 
or societal trends usually call for some degree of adaptability. In such a case, 
lacking political response in terms of institutional recalibration leads to the expi-
ration of the institution - without the necessity to achieve a political consensus 
for reform (Hacker 2004). Especially the mechanism of layering provides a poten-
tial explanation for the combination of institutional rigidity in the core of labor 
markets and exacerbated insider-outsider cleavages: if flexibilization can only be 
implemented  at  the  margin  (e.g.  through  temporary  or  low-wage  jobs  and 
agency work) and differential growth is promoted later on, this implies an in-
crease in the number of atypically employed. 
Following the idea of incremental change, Palier and Martin (2007) identified a 
typical sequential process of transformation in Continental welfare states. Start-
ing from the adverse circumstances for institutional change, they describe a re-
form trajectory where each step provides for some ad-hoc adjustment to urgent 
problem  pressure  and  at the same  time  shapes  the  conditions  for subsequent 
steps. Different from fundamental reform, a short-term perspective in the prob-
lem solution prevails with the result that reform stages can even be contradic-
tory. As Clegg (2007) points out, such a reform cascade can lead to dualization: in 
order to maintain insiders’ privileges and yet improve labor market perform-
ance, the tendency of each reform stage is to target flexibilization at outsiders. 
Therefore,  change  in  most  Continental  labor  markets  has  taken  place  not  “in 
spite of attempts to preserve the status quo, but rather because of them” (p. 611). 
By and large, the sequentialist view describes a reform path, whose single stages 
are  restricted  to the  short-term  interest  of  maintaining  the  overall system.  As 
their outcomes determine the opportunities for following reforms, a more or less 7 
 
consistent reform path may occur. The consequence of this path is a strong ten-
dency towards flexibilization through dualization. While drift and layering usu-
ally  (although  not  necessarily)  refer  to  politically  promoted  processes,  where 
change is pursued intentionally, the sequential-reform approach points to unin-
tended side-effects as well. This makes the approach valuable for the investiga-
tion of our thesis, which bases on the idea that short-term orientation and side-
effects have a significant influence on reform outcomes in Germany. 
 
3. The 1980 and the early 1990s: Reforming the margin  
 
The earlier phase of the transformation of the German employment system can 
be located somewhat between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. In an increas-
ingly difficult economic environment, provisions governing the core of the labor 
market such as social insurance, dismissal protection, and collective bargaining 
remained  basically  intact.  Early  retirement  and  passive  labor  market  policies 
were expanded to keep open unemployment low despite cyclical and structural 
adjustment pressure. These instruments, which were also the major tools used to 
cope with economic restructuring after reunification, helped, first, stabilize the 
income position of core workers which were made redundant and, second, reju-
venate the staff in manufacturing.  
However, in the mid-1990s the persistent weakness of the German labor market 
to generate additional jobs, in particular in the service sector, was increasingly 
perceived as a direct consequence of the established institutional arrangement 
and the policies implemented so far. Reducing labor supply by limiting access of 
women to the labor market and by extensive early retirement was not seen as a 
remedy anymore but rather as a problem since this was associated with low ac-
tivity and increasing fiscal pressure on the welfare state in terms of raising con-
tribution rates. Consolidation of social security and some partial deregulation of 
the labor market appeared on the agenda. The weak development of employ-
ment  in  (formal)  private  services  was  largely  ascribed  to  either  strong  wage 
compression due to sectoral collective bargaining and implicit minimum wages 
set by social assistance or by the growing burden of non-wage labor costs which 
was seen as particularly harmful to personal, labor-intensive services (Scharpf 
1997).  
Keeping the core of the labor market stable and productive was only one element 
of the policy response in this phase. As a second tier, the foundations for subse-
quent growth of flexible types of employment were also laid in this period. This 8 
 
holds for the liberalization of temporary work agencies in 1972 and the permis-
sion of fixed-term contracts without valid reasons in case new staff was hired in 
1985. In 1996 the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts without valid reason 
was raised to 24 months, while the maximum number of successive contracts 
was limited to four. At the same time, it was prohibited to hire employees on a 
fixed-term  basis  after  having  them  employed  on  a  permanent  basis  and  dis-
missed within four month before the temporary hiring. Dismissal protection re-
mained in place over the whole period with some minor exceptions. In 1996, the 
final phase of the Christian Democratic/Liberal coalition, the size threshold rele-
vant for the application of dismissal protection was raised from five to ten em-
ployees and social selection criteria were defined more narrowly and allowed for 
the consideration of enterprise interests.  
In the same period, part-time work at low weekly hours became a more and 
more frequently used instrument in personal and private labor-intensive services 
such as retail trade, hotels and restaurants or office administration where regular 
full- and part-time work was hampered due to high non-wage labor costs. Em-
ployers increasingly relied on so-called ‘geringfügige Beschäftigung’ (minor em-
ployment contracts) exploiting a legal provision that had been introduced into 
the German social insurance code much earlier (Müller-Schoell 2006). Minor em-
ployment contracts were originally seen as a provision to allow workers with an 
irregular work  schedule or  only  a  few  weekly hours worked  to  be  exempted 
from social insurance. Now it was perceived as a strategy to establish a low-cost 
segment  mainly  employing  married  women  seeking  for  some  supplementary 
earnings.  
Social insurance, active labor market policies and employment protection were 
not altered for regular employees – in fact, early retirement and large scale use of 
active  labor  market  policies  such  as  direct  job  creation,  short-time  work  and 
training  courses  were  used  to  reduce  labor  supply  and  limit  unemployment 
growth. In collective bargaining, however, new forms of flexibility were intro-
duced.  Attempts  at  general  working  time  reduction  were  complemented  and 
balanced with more internal flexibility, e.g. through the introduction of working 
time accounts. In a situation of increased global competition in quality produc-
tion, wage moderation became a major issue. Concession bargaining not only 
meant more modest wage increases but also opening clauses allowing for enter-
prise-level deviations in terms of remuneration or working time. Starting with 
pioneering agreements in the automotive industry (for example BMW in 1988), 
such plant-level deviations from collective agreements became an attractive tool 
to improve the competitiveness of firms and sectors in critical periods. Facing the 9 
 
imminent risk of unemployment, concessions were accepted by employees and 
trade unions in exchange for employment stability. 
 
4. Limiting Labor Market Flexibility: 1998-2001 
 
With the change in government from the Christian-Democratic/Liberal to the So-
cial-Democratic/Green coalition in fall 1998 in the context of an economic up-
swing in the late 1990s, re-regulation of atypical jobs became a major issue since 
opposition to the cuts in social security and employment protection implemented 
by the preceding coalition was a major factor explaining the 1998 shift in power. 
Hence,  in  order  to  prevent  a  further  crowding  out  of  regular  employment 
through an expansion of non-standard jobs, i.e. marginal employment and fixed-
term contracts, but also self-employment, the early phase of the Red-Green coali-
tion was characterized by steps to expand the realm of employment covered by 
social insurance. In 1999 dismissal protection was restored for workers in small 
firms between five and ten employees. A broader definition of social criteria was 
reestablished. Marginal jobs were partially integrated into social protection re-
placing former lump sum employer taxes with employer contributions to social 
insurance  and  banned  second  jobs  free  of  charges.  Freelance  workers  who 
worked for only one client were defined as dependent workers and therefore in-
tegrated into social insurance. Finally, in 2001, fixed-term contracts without valid 
reason were restricted to initial hirings, i.e. to situations in which there had not 
been any employment relation between employee and employer before. More 
coherent activation of benefit recipients and the creation of a broader low-wage 
sector in services in order to generate entry opportunities for long-term unem-
ployed or low-skilled jobseekers became a more pressing, but also contentious 
issue at the time. This led to the introduction of limited local activation models 
bringing together welfare and labor market administration as well as to the im-
plementation of regional in-work benefit experiments. Wage flexibility and wage 
moderation were still a major issue, however. Over the 1990s the incorporation of 
opening clauses in collective agreements rose further and became a wide spread 
instrument to realize more flexibility for individual firms. For example, between 
1993 and 1999, the number of employees in industry and construction that were 
covered by such a clause sharply rose from 0.6 to 6.6 millions (Rehder 2003).  
 10 
 
5 The Hartz reforms and ‘Agenda 2010’ (2002-2005) 
 
While the economic boom period around the millennium was associated with 
stronger regulatory attempts, the downturn after 2001 paved the way for a para-
digm shift in labor market and social policies as well as new deregulatory re-
forms. Under the impression of the increasing problem pressure, the Red-Green 
coalition departed from the reform path that had swept it into office and imple-
mented several changes that even contradicted earlier actions. Having used ac-
tive and passive labor market policies to accommodate for lack of labor demand 
after reunification, Germany now embarked on the European path towards acti-
vation more seriously. The Hartz reform package together with the controversial 
‘Agenda 2010’ meant a transition from human capital oriented labor market poli-
cies to a stronger emphasis of demanding elements reinforcing jobseekers will-
ingness to take up even low paid jobs. This meant stricter job search monitoring, 
harsher sanctioning provisions in unemployment benefits and a shift from long-
term training and direct job creation measures to shorter programs aiming at an 
accelerated  reintegration  into  the  labor  market.  Demanding  elements  become 
more important than in the past. The most important changes concerned unem-
ployment benefits. After its generosity had already been affected by the removal 
of  the  qualification  safeguard  clause  in  1997,  now  unemployment  insurance 
benefit duration for older workers was shortened from 32 to 18 months. This ef-
fectively removed a de facto early retirement tool. Even more important was the 
merger of earnings-related, but means-tested unemployment assistance and so-
cial  assistance  into  ‘Arbeitslosengeld  II’,  a  general  minimum  income  support 
scheme  with  strong  activation  requirements  (‘Hartz  IV’).  In  principle  all  jobs 
were considered suitable. However, the fact that minimum income support was 
not only available for jobseekers and unemployed persons, but was made more 
easily accessible for workers and self-employed with low income meant that a 
general in-work benefit system had been created. Given the fact that persons re-
lying on minimum income support can earn up to 100 EUR per month without 
cuts in benefits and can keep 20% of earnings between 100 and 800 EUR as well 
as 10% of earnings between 800 and 1200 or 1500 EUR, there are strong incen-
tives to work part-time, in particular to combine minimum income support with 
a  Minijob.  Minijobs  were  also  liberalized  in  the  sense  that  second  jobs  were 
(again) exempted from employee social contribution and taxes. Additionally, the 
working time ceiling of 15 hours per week was removed. Since there is no bind-
ing minimum wage in many areas of the economy, Minijobs provide the possibil-
ity to agree on low hourly wages, which are supplemented by state subsidies.  11 
 
Besides the expansion of the Minijobs, the Red-Green government also decided 
to liberalize other types of atypical employment in the course of the Hartz re-
forms.  The  age  threshold  for  the  application  of  repeated  fixed-term  contracts 
without valid reason was lowered from 58 to 52 years. To counter legal concerns, 
this clause was later restricted to newly hired older unemployed. Also, newly es-
tablished firms  were  allowed to use fixed-term contracts for up  to four  years 
without a valid reason. A similar tendency could be observed for agency work: 
between 1985 and 2002 the maximum duration of an assignment had been ex-
tended from three to 24 months. Only shortly after, it was finally abolished by 
the first Hartz law, which contained further ease of regulation. It suspended a 
ban on synchronization and re-employment so that agencies now can repeatedly 
hire a worker only for the length of his assignment in a user company. In 2003, 
the prohibition on agency work in construction was abolished. As agency work 
was  seen as a promising tool to integrate  unemployed into the labor market, 
staffing agencies were introduced into active labor market policies. Another ele-
ment of flexibility implemented with the Hartz reforms and the Agenda 2010 
was the strong expansion of start-up subsidies (‘Me Inc.’) together with an aboli-
tion of the master craftsman’s diploma in many crafts. 
Summarizing  this  phase,  the  reforms  of  second  Red-Green  legislative  period 
brought about a great deal of deregulation at the margin of the labor market. But 
how was the core affected? Here, legislative changes were very modest. Contrary 
to the early years of the coalition, in 2004 the firm size threshold for dismissal 
protection was lifted again to ten employees. In addition, the definition of social 
criteria was restricted again and the consideration of business preferences intro-
duced as further criteria. Finally, employees were allowed to opt for severance 
pay instead of taking legal action.  
More relevant for the flexibilization of the core labor market was the advancing 
deterioration  of  collective  bargaining.  Besides  a  general  trend  towards  lower 
bargaining coverage and unionization, exit options were used by more and more 
firms. By 2005, already 29 percent of all employees working under a collective 
agreement in West Germany and 21 in the east were covered by opening clauses 
(Kohaut/Schnabel 2007). These figures illustrate that a growing number of em-
ployees works under conditions that deviate from collectively defined ones. As 
the principle of favorability is avoided, the deviation is likely to be at the expense 
of workers, which in turn provides more flexibility to the employer. Besides the 
quantitative expansion, one can also observe a change in the purpose opening 
clauses serve. In the 1980s and 1990 they were mainly applied to handle excep-
tional crisis situations. But increasingly plant-level concessions are agreed upon 12 
 
in a preventive way, i.e. in the absence of acute problems (Seifert/Massa-Wirth 
2005).  
 
6. Taming Market Forces (2005 – 2009)  
 
The Hartz and Agenda 2010 reform limited the realm of unemployment insur-
ance and brought in higher flexibility at the margin in terms of temporary agency 
work, self-employment and low-pay jobs. While this may have contributed to job 
creation in the service sector, growing concerns of a widening wage dispersion as 
well as widely shared criticisms raised by alleged socially unfair effects of Hartz 
IV led to the loss of power of reform-oriented Social Democrats in 2005. The fol-
lowing Grand Coalition formed by Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
took a much more cautious stance on labor market reforms. Shifting the regular 
statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years for younger cohorts was the last re-
trenchment issue  adopted  after  the  Hartz  reforms.  Deregulatory  ideas  formu-
lated in the Christian Democratic campaign, for example concerning dismissal 
protection,  were  not  pursued  further.  On  the  contrary,  the  recent  policy  dis-
course was characterized by overwhelming equity and social justice concerns. 
This eventually resulted in steps aiming at restabilizing social insurance and es-
tablishing new minimum provisions at the lower end of the labor market where 
no collective agreements exist and where activation has increased the prepared-
ness to take up low-paid jobs. First, unemployment benefits for older workers 
were prolonged from 18 to 24 months again. Second, new instruments providing 
subsidized  employment  for  hard-to-place  long-term  unemployed  were  intro-
duced,  thus  easing  wage  pressures  in  this  segment.  Finally,  and  most  impor-
tantly, minimum wages become a prominent issue on the German policy agenda 
for the first time. Increases in the share of low-pay in particular in private ser-
vices,  most  specifically  the  combination  of  low  wages  with  in-work  benefits, 
raised broad concerns about unfair remuneration. Trade unions and Social De-
mocrats pushed for general statutory minimum wage, but as this was opposed 
by the Christian Democrats a compromise could only be reached regarding the 
extension of sectoral minimum wage agreements in some service sectors such as 
cleaning, postal services and - eventually - temporary agency work where differ-
ent competing collectively agreed wage scales coexist so far.  
With respect to the most recent economic downturn, German policy makers cur-
rently rely on an expansive use of short-time work or partial unemployment. The 
maximum duration of short-time work allowance funded by unemployment in-
surance was extended from 6 to 18 months for 2009 and 2010. Hence, reduced 13 
 
working  hours  are  compensated  for by  social insurance  if  intra-firm  working 
time flexibility is not sufficient, thus avoiding or at least postponing dismissals 
and loss of skilled labor. Short-time work is concentrated among export-oriented 
manufacturing firms which are most heavily hit by declining orders. Parallel to 
that,  manufacturing  firms  have  reduced  the  utilization  of  temporary  agency 
work. In principle, agency employees also have become eligible for the short-
time work allowance, but access is more difficult for them. Hence, labor market 
risks of the current crisis are allocated in a dual manner: core staff is held quite 
stable whereas the flexible segment reacts more swiftly. 
The bottom line of the previous chapters is that reforms in the German labor 
market proceeded in an incremental and inconsistent way. Far-reaching reform 
efforts usually led to electoral defeat and at least to partial re-regulation. While 
under  these  conditions  privileges  of  standard  employment  (such  as  dismissal 
protection) were difficult to attack, reforms mainly addressed the (de)regulation 
of atypical jobs. Before an attempt is made to give an explanation for the peculiar 
German  reform  trajectory,  the  next  chapter  will  present  its  labor  market  out-
comes. 
 
7. The German Labor Market Today 
 
After a sequence of institutional reforms the performance of the German labor 
market is fundamentally different from the often stylized ‘welfare without work’ 
situation observed in the 1990s. Due to a positive interaction between dynamic 
economic activity and increased labor market flexibility both in the core and at 
the margin, total employment could reach a new peak in 2008 – just before the 
current economic crisis. With 69 percent, the German employment rate is now 
about three percentage points higher than in the last economic upturn. One has 
to be aware, however, the development of total hours worked was more stagnant 
than employment counted in persons. This is largely due to the strong expansion 
of part-time work. The peak of the employment rate was associated with a rela-
tively steep decline both in registered unemployment and broad unemployment 
including participant stocks in active labor market policies and different non-
activating benefit schemes such as disability benefits or early retirement. Hence, 
the German labor market has grown – but at the same time the heterogeneity of 
jobs and remuneration has increased. While the share of atypical jobs rose at the 
expense of standard employment over the 1990s, the most recent years saw a 
relative stability of the numbers and shares of standard jobs. Nonetheless, flexi-
ble employment contracts such as temporary agency work, fixed-term contracts, 14 
 
marginal jobs and self employment continued to expand and offered new oppor-
tunities in the service sector for labor market entrants who had been unemployed 
or inactive before. Hence, after a rather strong decline in the 1990s one can cur-
rently observe some revival of standard employment relationships and socially 
insured jobs, accompanied by shrinking inactivity (figure 1). However, standards 
jobs are more flexible themselves due to flexible working time and remuneration 
arrangements – and long-term wage moderation has made them cheaper and 
more attractive to employers.  
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This employment growth was associated with different forms of dualization be-
tween manufacturing and established sectors of the service economy on the one 
hand and dynamic private, personal and business services and creative sectors 
on  the  other  hand.  At  the  same  time,  new  and  varying  forms  of  dualization 
within the sectors have emerged. First, one has to note that the share of standard 
employment  (including  longer  part-time  covered  by  social  insurance)  differs 
widely across sectors. It is much higher in traditional core sectors of manufactur-15 
 
ing and services such as construction, energy and water supply than in public, 
personal and business services. Sectors which already had a low share of stan-
dard employment in the late 1990s experienced the most significant declines over 
the last decade while those sectors exhibiting a large share of open-ended full-
time jobs continued to do so as table 2 shows. Hence, there is a tendency of du-
alization with persistently high shares of standard jobs in some sectors and more 
diverse staffing structures in others. According to the OECD, employment stabil-
ity,  expressed  in  long  average  job  duration  did  not  decrease,  but  increase  in 
Germany between 1992 and 2007 (from 10.7 to 11.2 years). This is in line with the 
observation that many firms applied a strategy of internal flexibilization. A typi-
cal pattern, especially in large manufacturing companies, is the combination of a 
stable core workforce with flexible working-time arrangements and the use of 
temporary agency  work for  production peaks  or  as  a  second  tier  of workers. 
However, this does not hold true for the entire economy: while business-related 
services are somewhat similarly organized to manufacturing (albeit with more 
temporary contracts and less agency work), in personal services, where the high-
skill equilibrium does not apply, ‘hiring and firing’ practices are more common 
(Hohendanner/Bellmann 2006). 
 
Figure 2: Marginal employment (Minijobs) relative to employment covered by social insur-
ance by sector, March 2008 (100% = parity) 
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ENERGY AND WATER SUPPLY
Chemical industry
Vehicle construction
Note: Broad sectors in capital letters, other items are selected subsectors. 
Source: Federal Employment Agency.
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 Table 2: Standard employment relationships by sector, 1997 and 2007 
  1997  2007  Difference 
Energy and water supply   93.1  90.5  -2.6 
Construction  90.6  84.1  -6.5 
Manufacturing  90.0  84.1  -5.9 
Transport and telecommunication  88.5  80.7  -7.8 
Banking and insurance   86.4  83.5  -2.9 
Public administration  83.0  83.1  +0.1 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair, hotels and restaurants  78.0  67.0  -9.0 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing   75.3  70.6  -4.7 
Real estate, business services  75.0  66.0  -9.0 
Public and personal services   72.1  64.0  -8.1 
Note:  Standard  employment  relationships  comprise  both  full-time  open-ended  contracts  and 
part-time work of more than 20 hours per week; source: Mikrozensus. 
 
The profile of sectors with respect to the use of different forms of non-standard 
employment is also diverse (table 3). High shares of employment covered by so-
cial insurance are found in manufacturing whereas less than 60% fall in this cate-
gory in restaurants, cleaning and other services. Longer part-time work (which is 
integrated into social insurance) makes up more than one third of all employees 
in the latter sector as well as in health, education and social services. Together 
with business and distributional services these sectors also have larger shares of 
Minijobs, while fixed-term jobs are mostly found in education, health and other 
social services. In cultural and creative sectors, but also in IT, self-employment 
features prominently. 
 
Table 3: Types of jobs in major sectors in % of total sectoral employment, 2006 
















Manufacturing  84  11  6  4  1  1  3  0 
Business and financial  
services  
74  26  13  7  4  2  1  0 
Retail, repair, transport,  
telecommunication  
74  28  15  4  1  2  1  0 
Health, education,  
social services  
72  41  11  12  3  3  0  4 
Public administration  63  27  3  6  1  1  0  3 
Restaurants, cleaning, 
other personal services 
57  37  26  8  3  2  0  2 
Source: IAB Establishment panel, Bellmann/Fischer/Hohendanner 2009. 17 
 
Temporary agency work now is a second tier of employment in manufacturing, 
particularly in metalworking and vehicle construction. It owes its attractiveness 
not only to greater numerical flexibility, as might be expected, but largely to the 
possibility  to  avoid  higher  wages.  Due  to  the  effects  of  the  Hartz  legislation 
(which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter) there are possibilities for 
virtually unlimited assignments of agency workers at a collectively agreed wage 
significantly below the wage scale of the metal sector. Given this option, produc-
tion staff that is mainly unskilled or low-skilled (table 4), can effectively be em-
ployed at different wage levels for similar tasks.  
 
Table 4: Occupations with more than five percent of agency workers, 2007 
Occupation  Share of agency workers in all workers  
covered by social insurance in % 
Unskilled laborers without further specification  41.5 
Welders   12.9  
Forklift operators  11.3 
Warehousemen, transport operators   10.1 
Painters and varnishers  6.8 
Metalworkers  6.8 
Promotional specialists  6.0 
Electricians  5.9 
Data entry operators  5.9 
Telephone operators   5.4 
Pipe layers and jointers  5.3 
Source: Brenke/Eichhorst 2008. 
 
 
Table 5: Full-time employees depending on basic income support, 2005  
 
Full-time workers receiv-
ing income support 
Share of full-time work-
ers in the sector in % 
Placement and temporary work agencies  36,700   2.1 
Hotels and restaurants  23,300   2.6 
Cleaning  10,500   0.8 
Agriculture  10,400   1.2 
Transport  10,100   1.6 
Social services   11,500   2.9 
Construction   9,400   3.1 
Health   9,000   6.4 
Source: Bruckmeier/Graf/Rudolph 2007. 
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In more labor-intensive and less skills-oriented service sectors, agency work is 
more frequent as are Minijobs (which are often held by married workers or by 
benefit recipients). As table 5 shows, in some cases even full-time employees rely 
on in-work benefits provided by the minimum income support scheme. 
By and large, a growing heterogeneity concerning employment contracts can be 
observed. This also holds true with respect to wage dispersion. The share of low 
wage grew strongly over the last decade as did wage dispersion among full-time 
workers (figure 3).  
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However, low hourly wages are mostly found amongst part-time workers, Mini-
job holders and working unemployed, i.e. in cases where employees can rely on 
other sources of income such as spouse’s earnings or in-work benefits. Hence, 
intra-household or public income support allowed for the emergence of a sector 
of low wage employment which, in turn, works as a marginal, more implicit and 
somewhat unintended second best solution to the German labor cost problem in 
some labor-intensive services (table 6).  
Dualization is not only a feature that can be observed when looking at overall or 
sectoral stocks of atypical or low-wage jobs. Even more crucial are patterns of 
persistence and chances of transition to more sustainable employment. Again, 
the extent to which atypical and low-wage jobs provide stepping stones or dead 
ends varies across the type of job. It also depends on sectoral and personal char-
acteristics. With reasonable simplification one can say that, in contrast to many 19 
 
other Continental European countries, fixed-term contracts often provide effec-
tive entry opportunities as they are used during qualification phases, mainly in 
the public sector, or as extended probationary periods in particular in industry 
and  private  services  (Boockmann/Hagen  2006).  Repeated  spells  of  fixed-term 
contracts are less common except for research, cultural and social services (table 
7).  
 
Table 6: Workers earning less than 7.50 € per hour gross, 2006  
Germany  West Germany  East Germany   
In %  Number 
in 1,000s 
In %  Number 
in 1,000s 
In %  Number 
in 1,000s  
Full-time  7  1,390  5  840  16  520 
Part-time   11  540  9  360  20  170 




50  930  45  610  64  250 
Total   12  3,720  11  2,660  21  980 
Source: Brenke/Ziemendorff 2008.  
 
The potential of upward mobility is more limited with regard to Minijobs. There 
are strong disincentives to move to longer part-time or even full-time work due 
to the rapid phase in of taxation and social insurance contributions above the 400 
EUR threshold, with the effect that Minijobs tend to be rather persistent (Fer-
tig/Kluve 2006, Freier/Steiner 2008). Agency work was mainly furthered to pro-
vide a way to integrate the unemployed into the labor market. In fact, statistical 
data confirm that agency workers were often unemployed before taking up an 
agency  job.  But  empirical  studies  could  not  provide  evidence  that  temporary 
agency work is a superior stepping stone so far (Kvasnicka 2008). This may even 
be more doubtful in cases of long-term posting in manufacturing where agency 
work is rather used as a stable secondary tier of employment substituting for di-
rect hirings. In contrast, subsidized start-ups proved to be relatively stable as an 
alternative  to  unemployment as  well as  an  instrument to  further job  creation 
(Caliendo/Künn/Wiesner 2008). Persistence is more of a problem in the low-wage 
sector  where  upward  mobility seems  quite  limited  in  Germany  and  probably 
lower than in the past (Schank et al. 2008). Low-skilled and older workers find it 
particularly hard to move to higher remuneration – as do part-time workers and 
Minijob  holders.  The  same  is  true  for  the  persistence  of  combinations  of  low 
earnings and minimum income support. Exit from benefit receipt is more fre-20 
 
quent in case of full-time workers than for those who work only within the range 
of 400 EUR (Bruckmeier/Graf/Rudolph 2007).  
 
Table 7: Role of fixed-term contracts and transition rates by sector  
  Share of 
fixed-term 
contracts in 






% of new 
hirings 
Transition rate to 
open-ended con-







term contracts in 
% of all termina-
tions 
Manufacturing  4  40  59  17 
Business and financial services  7  37  48  12 
Retail, repair, transport, tele-
communication  
4  35  62  8 
Restaurants, cleaning, other 
personal services 
8  38  40  14 
Health, education, social ser-
vices  
12  64  31  34 
Public administration  6  67  24  36 
Source: Establishment panel, Bellmann/Fischer/Hohendanner 2009. 
 
 
8. A Dualized Pattern of Flexibility  
 
Turning back to the initial question of this paper, first of all, it can be concluded 
that the German labor market does exemplify a process of incremental change. 
As could be shown by the description of reforms over the last two decades, a se-
quence of interwoven changes in public policy and collective bargaining has con-
tributed to a broad transformation of the German labor market. On the one hand, 
changes in employment protection led to a redefinition of the margin by setting 
up  alternative  employment  types  while  dismissal  protection  of  standard  em-
ployment was hardly modified. On the other hand, the shift towards activation 
meant stricter limitations to status-oriented social protection and increased job 
search requirement, however, mostly for the long-term unemployed.  
All these provisions subsumed under the heading of ‘marginal flexibilization’ 
were launched with small, at first glance negligible reforms, but over time be-
came major elements of the institutional set-up. For instance, atypical types of 
employment like agency work and temporary contracts have been introduced as 
marginal supplements in the beginning, but through an incremental process of 21 
 
differential growth they gained significance in the German labor market. Against 
this backdrop, large parts of German labor market reforms can be, at least with 
hindsight, perceived in terms of layering. However, the partial crowding-out of 
standard employment can not be merely  understood as a politically intended 
process. In accordance with the assumptions made in the beginning of this paper, 
it seems that policy makers did not pursue a deliberate long-term strategy, but 
that they were guided by a) the motivation to preserve the status-quo as far as 
possible and b) a short-term perspective on acute problems. Both features result 
from the political economy of Continental welfare states (which becomes visible 
in the German electorates’ reaction on more ambitious reforms) and help to ex-
plain the peculiar evolution of the German system. 
To understand the contradictory reform trajectory in the German labor market, 
one has to take into consideration that the question of how to regulate atypical 
work places policy makers in a strategic dilemma: such jobs stabilize the core by 
making the system more efficient, but at the same time they tend to replace regu-
lar employment. This dilemma can be illustrated by the position of unions and 
works councils towards the issue. Since the introduction of agency work in the 
1970s, unions heavily opposed it and collective agreements with temporary-work 
agencies were objected. The intention was to prevent crowding-out of standard 
jobs and to achieve a total ban on agency work. However, many works councils 
in user companies followed a different rationale. In the German dual system of 
industrial  relations,  plant-level  codetermination  is  formally  independent  from 
unions. Therefore, works councils were free to agree on plant-level compromises, 
in  which  acceptance  of  agency  work  was  traded  against  maintenance  of  core 
workforce privileges. By increasing numerical flexibility, agency work also was 
seen as a means to secure standard jobs (Holst et al. 2008, Promberger 2005). 
Hence, in the course of the 1990s, unions partly gave up their strict attitude to-
wards  agency  work.  This  was  mainly  due  to  persistent  mass  unemployment, 
which questioned the legitimacy of union strategies and brought about strong 
pressure to achieve more flexibility in the labor market. In fact, the reorientation 
went  so  far  that  the  umbrella  organization  of German  unions,  which  was  in-
volved in the Hartz reforms, did approve the liberalization of agency work in 
2004. The purpose of the reform was to increase the numerical flexibility of firms 
and to create more employment. To prevent wage competition between atypical 
and standard jobs, the principle of equal pay was agreed upon. The exception 
from this principle (for cases where agency workers have their own collective 
agreement) was not considered problematic, as it gave unions for the first time 
control over agency workers’ wages. However, the clause was used by employ-
ers and so called ‘Christian unions’ (which are way closer to employers’ interests 22 
 
than the majority unions) to agree on very low wages for agency workers. This 
avoidance of equal treatment was neither expected by the government nor by un-
ions and led to a considerable wage gap. Accordingly, agency work largely owes 
its attractiveness to an unintended wage competition. It is only lately that the 
Grand Coalition government of Christian and Social Democrats, who introduced 
the  reforms  in  2003/04,  decided  to  re-regulate  agency  work  with  minimum 
wages. This will mean a partial closure of the wage gap resulting from the for-
mer reform. But the fact that there are competing minimum wage proposals in 
the agency sector makes a solution particularly difficult.  
The example of agency work reveals typical features of German labor market re-
form: changes aimed at stabilizing the overall system of standard employment in 
a short-term perspective may lead to more fundamental change in the long run. 
Although  one  can  reasonably  argue  that  the  reform  trajectory  followed  the 
mechanism of layering, no long-term strategy to promote differential growth is 
recognizable.  Over the last decades, reforms were implemented  by Conserva-
tives as well as Social Democrats. And the largest expansion of agency work even 
appears to be due to unintended side-effects which are tackled again by recent 
legislation.  
The growth of atypical employment raises the question whether there are conse-
quences for the institutional design of standard employment. It has been men-
tioned above that flexible jobs simultaneously contradict and reinforce the ‘rule’ 
of  the  standard  employment  relationship  (Clegg  2007),  because  the  dualized 
logic relieves reform pressure on the overall system, but, in turn, creates competi-
tion between labor market segments. In such a context, the specificity of their 
human capital makes the group of insiders particularly vulnerable. Limited port-
ability of skills bears the risk of sunk costs in case of dismissal. Thus, mass un-
employment and a reform agenda, which promotes the availability of cheap al-
ternatives in the labor market, constitute a serious threat to job holders. Accord-
ingly, one would expect an ambivalent attitude of insiders towards dualization: 
atypical jobs can be seen as a means to sustain privileges, but once they start to 
replace standard employment, pressure for reform of the core labor market even 
increases. However, as the German high-skill equilibrium is largely incompatible 
with a more dynamic labor market, this reform pressure is not likely to lead to 
more external flexibility, which would contradict core workers’ as well as em-
ployers’ interests. Rather, one would expect a reaction buttressing a long-term 
employment relationship, i.e. strategies aiming at more internal flexibility on the 
plant level (Carlin/Soskice 2009). And in fact, as expected against the backdrop of 
labor market complementarities, the regulation of regular dismissals has been 
overly stable with only minor changes. Concerning unemployment benefits, the 23 
 
Hartz reforms mainly addressed long-term recipients, while the net replacement 
rates within the first year remained very high by international standards (OECD 
2007).  
The flexibilization of the German core labor market can not be ascribed to state 
regulation, but has its roots in private sector compromises. Over the past twenty 
years, it was primarily achieved by a reinterpretation of collective bargaining in-
stitutions. In a process of “coordinated decentralization” (Bosch 2004) unions in-
creasingly accepted the flexibilization of industry-wide agreements via opening 
clauses, which permit considerable firm-level deviations. Their willingness to do 
so is to be explained by the crisis German unions face. Traditionally, centraliza-
tion on branch level and pattern-setting by the export-oriented sector allowed 
German unions to minimize wage competition. However, from the early 1990s 
onwards, the downward rigidity of wages and inflexibility of working-time ar-
rangements were more and more perceived as excessively restrictive and led to a 
substantial withdrawal from collective bargaining. The crisis was exacerbated by 
a dramatic decline of membership in the post-unification era, which meant a fur-
ther loss of bargaining power and political influence. Against this background, 
unions were not able to resist demands for more plant-level differentiation (Ad-
dison et al. 2007, Hassel/Rehder 2001). 
Thus,  although collective  agreements are  still  in force and  cover  considerable 
parts of the labor force, the advancement of opening clauses means a shift of bar-
gaining power within the dual system from sectoral interest representation to-
wards works councils. As their primary concern is not so much inter-firm soli-
darity,  but  rather  to  prevent  downsizing  of  the  core  workforce,  plant-level 
agreements are more likely to contain productivity-oriented concessions (Whit-
tall 2005). Given the  possibility to substitute  external by internal adaptability, 
opting for flexible working-time and wage cuts usually appears as the lesser of 
two evils from a works council perspective. Such arrangements constitute a func-
tional  equivalent  to  external  flexibility  (e.g.  redundancies  or  increased  use  of 
agency work), because the volume of work can be adapted to short-term varia-
tions  in  the  production.  Altogether,  the  labor  cost  gap between  standard  and 
atypical employment decreases. The growth of firm-level agreements and work-
ing-time flexibility therefore can be interpreted as a strategic response of insiders 
to the threat of greater external flexibility. This notion is supported by the fact 
that works council agreement to flexibilization is not limited to exceptional crisis 
situations,  where  redundancies  constitute  an  immediate  threat  (which  is  the 
original idea). Rather, opening clauses were increasingly taken up by ‘healthy’ 
firms as well, meaning that they became a normal tool to foster the competitive-
ness of standard employment (Seifert/Massa-Wirth 2005). It follows that firms 24 
 
have the possibility to impose parts of their entrepreneurial risk on their employ-
ees. In the context of coordinated decentralization, the consequences of shocks 
can more easily be redirected to the workforce, which (depending on the case) 
has to accept wage cuts or an intensified labor process and reduced leisure time. 
Taking the competition between typical and atypical work into account helps to 
understand the profound reinterpretation of German social partnership in the 
past 20 years. In the decentralized system, core workers face strong pressure to 
trade  income  security  against  (the  maintenance  of)  job  security.  It  can  be  as-
sumed that the tendency towards flexibility in standard employment is favored 
by the growing competition of atypical jobs, which constitute a cheap alternative. 
However, it seems that particularly in the manufacturing sector also employers 
prefer the combination of internal flexibilization with agency work, which allows 
them to retain firm-specific knowledge in periods of cyclical slumps. 
 
Table 8: Sequences of reforms since the early nineties 
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Negative  Positive  Negative  Positive 
Unemployment  Growing  Falling  Growing  Falling  
Number of 
standard jobs 




Modest growth  Modest growth  Strong growth  Strong growth 
Source: authors’ compilation.  
 
Table 8 summarizes the logic of labor market reform in Germany. It reveals an 
inconsistent succession of deregulatory and re-regulatory phases as well as the 25 
 
mechanism behind this process: in critical periods with high adjustment pressure 
(expressed in negative employment growth and rising unemployment) attempts 
at stronger deregulation are made, while the subsequent economic pick-up usu-
ally  leads  to  partial  re-regulation.  This  is  in  line  with  the  assumptions  made 
about the characteristics of reform in Continental welfare states: short-term ori-
entation, status-quo bias, and transformation through incremental change. 
 
9. Outlook: Dualized Flexibility and Beyond 
 
The German labor market exhibits a dual model of flexibility. Against the popu-
lar notion of overly rigid standard employment, it seems that both the core and 
the margin are flexible - but in very different ways. Standard employment is still 
sheltered by dismissal protection, but has changed significantly with respect to 
collective bargaining, wages and working time – and indirectly, flexibility at the 
margin inserted via temporary agency work, fixed-term contracts and marginal 
jobs has contributed to this. Both sides of flexibility have a competitive relation-
ship, but they also reinforce each other. Thus, there are new forms of interaction 
or complementarity  between  core  and  margin  in  particular  in manufacturing, 
where agency work effectively constitutes an alternative tier of a marginal labor 
force since, in exchange for coverage by equal pay or collective agreements, it is 
in principle possible to post agency workers on a permanent basis. A similar pat-
tern can be observed in services with part-time work and Minijobs and in the 
public sector with fixed-term contracts.  
Structural change does and probably will play a crucial role in the transforma-
tion of the German labor market. Standard employment relationships are still 
there, open-ended, full-time, but they are more flexible – and the recent growth 
of socially insured jobs can in fact be attributed to wage moderation in standard 
employment and a growing part of fixed-term and part-time jobs and agency 
work. Flexible employment seems to benefit from the growth of the service sec-
tor. Here, atypical jobs massively contributed to job creation, as it helped to over-
come traditional labor cost and regulatory problems. However, job growth was 
associated  with  higher  inequality  between  jobs.  A  growing  low-wage  sector 
driven by lower bargaining coverage in full-time jobs, larger numbers of part-
time and marginal jobs as well as in-work benefits implicitly eased some of Ger-
many’s notorious labor cost problems in the service economy. Hence, there is a 
double dualization: an inter- and an intra-sectoral one. The current downturn 
threatens not only atypical workers, but it may also lead to a medium- and long-
term decline in core manufacturing sectors and traditional services. As these sec-26 
 
tors still show high shares of standard employment, this process will be associ-
ated with a shrinking number of regular jobs. Future job creation in services will 
then probably imply a stronger reliance on flexible, non-standard jobs.  
With respect to the future of the German employment system, there are reasons 
to be more optimistic than most commentators are at the moment. For one thing, 
the erosion of the ‘Normalarbeitsverhältnis’ might be less severe than commonly 
depicted.  Standard  employment  relationships  are still  there,  open-ended,  full-
time, but they are more flexible – and the recent growth of socially insured jobs 
can in fact be attributed to wage moderation in this segment. In sharp contrast to 
state regulation, social partnership has proven that it is capable to adopt stan-
dard employment to increased competitive pressure. The chosen path of internal 
flexibilization is compatible with the typical German production model and at 
the  same  time it provides  more numerical  and  wage  flexibility  to  employers. 
Thereby, it might not make atypical work redundant, but it certainly is a way to 
make standard jobs more cost attractive and to reduce the demand for alternative 
types of employment. Also, skilled labor will benefit from demographic change 
and a longer working life which may also mean stronger investment in long-term 
employment and lifelong learning. 
Even if – driven by structural change – standard employment should continue to 
decline,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  ever  lower  employment  security  and 
stronger wage dispersion. The most recent attempts at limiting market forces can 
be seen as part of policies emphasizing minimum income protection and mini-
mum standards in an otherwise more flexible labor market. At the same time, 
social insurance has lost much of its status-protecting substance due to pension 
reforms, the abolition of early retirement and stronger activation. Hence, the fu-
ture may bring about some erosion of the duality between status-oriented social 
insurance and minimum standards. The Bismarckian tradition will probably con-
tinue to exist, but it will mean less privileges compared to alternative types of 
employment, as minimum standards become more substantial. This would mean 
less dualism and a more egalitarian distribution of labor market risks.   27 
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11. Appendix  
 






















of civilian labor 
force)  
Employment 






1992  2.2  -1.5  10.3  6.3  66.2  13.4 / 6.0 
1993  -0.8  -1.3  3.6  7.6  65.1  13.6 / 6.3 
1994  2.7  -0.1  2.9  8.2  64.5  13.6 / 6.6 
1995  1.9  0.2  3.4  8.0  64.6  13.4 / 6.0 
1996  1.0  -0.3  1.0  8.7  64.3  14.2 / 6.4 
1997  1.8  -0.1  0.6  9.4  63.8  14.6 / 6.4 
1998  2.0  1.2  0.8  9.1  64.7  14.5 / 6.2 
1999  2.0  1.4  1.0  8.2  65.2  16.2 / 8.3 
2000  3.2  1.9  2.0  7.5  65.6  16.9 / 7.9 
2001  1.2  0.4  1.6  7.6  65.8  18.1 / 8.6 
2002  0.0  -0.6  1.3  8.4  65.3  18.3 / 8.5 
2003  -0.2  -0.9  1.6  9.3  64.6  19.1 / 9.0 
2004  1.2  0.4  0.1  9.8  65.0  19.2 / 9.5 
2005  0.8  -0.1  -0.1  10.6  65.5  19.4 / 9.5 
2006  3.0  0.6  1.3  9.9  67.2  20.9 / 10.6 
2007  2.5  1.7  1.3  8.4  69.0  22.5 / 11.3 
2008  1.3  1.3  2.4  7.3  -  - 
 Sources: OECD Employment Outlook, Employment Outlook Statistics; last column: authors’ cal-
culation based on GSOEP. 
 